Abstract-In the q-ary online (or "causal") channel coding model, a sender wishes to communicate a message to a receiver by transmitting a codeword x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , q −1} n symbol-by-symbol via a channel limited to at most pn errors and p * n erasures. The channel is "online" in the sense that at the ith step of communication the channel decides whether to corrupt the ith symbol or not based on its view so far, i.e., its decision depends only on the transmitted symbols (x 1 , . . . , x i ) . This is in contrast to the classical adversarial channel in which the corruption is chosen by a channel that has full knowledge of the sent codeword x. In this paper, we study the capacity of q-ary online channels for a combined corruption model, in which the channel may impose at most pn errors and at most p * n erasures on the transmitted codeword. The online channel (in both the error and erasure case) has seen a number of recent studies, which present both upper and lower bounds on its capacity. In this paper, we give a full characterization of the capacity as a function of q, p, and p * .
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I. INTRODUCTION
R ELIABLE communication over different types of channels has been extensively studied in electrical engineering and computer science. One frequently used communication channel model is the binary erasure channel, in which a bit (a zero or one) is either transmitted intact or erased. Specifically, an erased bit is a visible error, denoted by a special symbol , which can be identified directly by a receiver. Another frequently studied channel model is the binary bit-flip channel, where bits can be flipped to their complement. Further generalization of channel alphabet to size q ≥ 2 leads to general q-ary channels.
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/ TIT.2019.2898863 to model the channel as a stochastic process; Hamming's approach is a combinatorial approach to model the channel by an adversarial process that can manipulate parts of the transmitted codeword arbitrarily, subject only to a limit on the number of corrupted symbols. It is interesting to further classify the Hamming model for an adversarial channel in terms of the adversary's knowledge of the codeword. Some examples include the standard adversarial channel (also referred to here as the omniscient adversary), e.g., [3] - [5] , the causal (or online) adversary, e.g., [1] , [6] - [10] , and the oblivious adversary, e.g., [11] - [13] ; from the strongest adversarial power to weakest. In one extreme, the omniscient adversarial model (a.k.a. the classical adversarial model) assumes that the channel has full knowledge of the entire codeword, and based on this knowledge, the channel can maliciously decide how to corrupt the codeword. In the other extreme, the oblivious adversarial model is a model in which the channel is clueless about the codeword and generates corruptions in a manner that is independent of the codeword being transmitted. The causal adversarial model is an intermediate model between the two extremes, in which the channel decides whether to tamper with a particular symbol of the codeword based only on the symbols transmitted so far. There are significant differences between the different adversarial models classified above (with respect to their capacity). We elaborate on these differences shortly.
In this work we focus on causal adversaries, and study reliable communication over q-ary causal adversarial channels. Specifically, we consider the following communication scenario. A sender (Alice) wishes to transmit a message m ∈ U to a receiver (Bob) over a q-ary causal adversarial channel by encoding m into a codeword x = (x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x n ) ∈ {0, 1, · · · , q − 1} n of length n. However, the channel is governed by a causal adversary (Calvin), who can observe x and impose up to a pn errors and p * n erasures. More importantly, Calvin decides whether to tamper with the i -th symbol of the codeword based only on the symbols (x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x i ) transmitted thus far. Roughly, if q n R distinct messages can be reliably sent using codewords of length n, we say that a code achieves rate R. We are interested in the maximum achievable rate R, which is the capacity C of the channel. (See Section II for precise definitions.)
A. Our Results
In this work we characterize the capacity of q-ary causal channels as a function of alphabet size q, error capability p, and erasure capability p * . Specifically, we propose and analyze an attack strategy similar to those for the binary cases [9] , [10] 0018-9448 © 2019 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information. The bound of 1 − p (in blue) corresponds to the capacity of binary oblivious erasure channel. The MRRW bound and the GV bound (both in dotted black) are the best known upper and lower bounds for binary omniscient erasure channels. The lower bound for binary causal erasure channels by Bassily and Smith [10] is plotted in green. (b) Binary adversarial bit-flip channels: The bound of 1 − H ( p) (in blue) corresponds to binary oblivious bit-flip channel. The MRRW bound and the GV bound are the best upper and lower bounds (both in dotted black) for binary omniscient bit-flip channels. For binary causal bit-flip channels, the previous lower bound by Haviv and Langberg [8] is a slight improvement over the GV bound.
(to be described in detail shortly), which gives an upper bound on the capacity, and a novel coding scheme, which implies a lower bound on the capacity matching our upper bound. Our main result can be summarized by the following theorem. (p) , (p 
where α q (p) = 1 − Since the capacity expression in Theorem I.1 is in the form of an optimization problem, we now provide a (partial) analytical characterization of the capacity region. Roughly speaking, it turns out that for every alphabet size q, if there are "not too many errors/erasures" then the capacity expression behaves "like that of a certain random error-erasure channel"; whereas if there are "many errors/erasures" then in fact the capacity expression is linear in p and p * . More precisely, using basic calculations, we prove the following Corollary of Theorem I.1 in Section B of the Appendix: 
Moreover, the two curves defining C are tangent at their meeting point. 1 We depict the channel capacity from Corollary I.2 (with other channel capacities and bounds) in Figures 1 and 2 .
Lookahead Adversary: We note that, as direct by-products of the analysis of our coding scheme, we can show that even if Calvin has "small" lookahead, the capacity is essentially unchanged. More precisely, if for any constant > 0, Calvin decides whether to tamper with the i -th symbol of the codeword based only on the symbols (x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x j ), where j = min{n, i + n}, then the capacity of the corresponding "n-lookahead is at most f () less than the corresponding C we show in Theorem I.1 above (for some continuous f ). Moreover, f () tends to 0 as tends to 0. We provide a rough argument in support of this claim in the remark at the end of Section III.
B. Previous Work
We start by briefly summarizing the state-of-the-art for erasure and error adversarial channels, for both omniscient and oblivious adversaries. The optimal rate of communication over binary omniscient adversarial channels (for both erasure and error) are long standing open problems in coding theory. The best known lower bounds for the problems derive from Gilbert-Varshamov codes (the GV bound) [3] , [4] , and the tightest upper bounds (the MRRW bounds) from the work by McEliece et al. [5] .
The literature on Arbitrarily Varying Channels (AVCs, e.g., [11] ) implies that the capacity of the binary oblivious adversarial error channel is 1 − H ( p), and that of oblivious adversarial erasure channels is 1 − p; these match the wellknown capacities of the corresponding "random noise" channels with bits flipped or erased Bernoulli( p), but are attainable even for noise patterns that can be chosen (up to an overall constraint of a p-fraction corruptions) by an adversary with full knowledge of the codebook, but no knowledge of the actually transmitted codeword. 2 An alternate proof of the capacity of the binary oblivious bit-flip channel was presented in [12] by Langberg, and a computationally efficient scheme achieving this rate was presented in [13] by Guruswami and Smith.
We now turn to the causal setting. As a causal adversary can never do better than an omniscient adversary and does at least as well as an oblivious one, the upper bounds on capacity for oblivious adversaries specified above act as upper bounds for the causal case as well; and the lower bounds on capacity for omniscient adversaries act as lower bounds for the causal case. For the binary causal adversarial bit-flip channel both bounds were improved. Specifically, the first nontrivial upper bound min 1 − H ( p), (1 − 4 p) + was given by Langberg et al. [7] , and later, the tightest upper bound was 2 In fact, it can even be shown that if Alice is allowed to use stochastic encoding -choosing one of multiple possible codewords randomly for each message she wants to transmit -then even for a maximal probability of error metric, a vanishingly small probability of error can be attained by capacity achieving codes. That is, there exists a sequence of codes whose rates asymptotically achieve the corresponding capacity, and such that for every message transmitted by Alice and for every corruption pattern imposed by Calvin, the message can be decoded correctly by Bob for "most" codewords corresponding to that message.
given by the continuing work of Dey et al. [9] , [17] . The best lower bound was described by Haviv and Langberg [8] which slightly improves over the GV bound. For the binary causal adversarial erasure channel the trivial upper bound of 1 − p was improved to 1 − 2 p by Bassily and Smith [10] who also present improved lower bounds that separate the achievable rate for causal adversarial erasures from the rates achievable for omniscient adversarial erasures.
Related results include the study of binary delayed adversaries by Dey et al. [18] who provide a characterization of the capacity in the case of "delays" d which are an arbitrarily small (but constant) fraction of the code block length n. The value d here corresponds to an adversarial model in which the decision of whether or not to corrupt the i th codeword bit depends only on (x 1 , . . . , x i−d ) (and the overall constraint on the number of bits that can be corrupted). It is interesting to note that, in this case as well as the oblivious one, the capacity of the bit-flip and bit-erasure channels matches the corresponding random noise capacities (of 1 − H ( p) and 1 − p). 3 On the other hand, as mentioned, the causal and n lookahead settings have strictly lower, but approximately matching, capacities. This seems to imply that the knowledge of the present is critical for Calvin to significantly reduce the capacity below the random noise capacity. The extreme case of a single bit of delay in causal erasure channels is studied in [19] where it is shown that such a delay is significant in the sense that it allows to improve the rate of Theorem I.1 from 1 − 2 p * to 1 − p * .
While the above discussion relates to the problem of binary alphabets, the work of Dey et al. [6] considered "large alphabet channels" (in which the alphabet size is "significantly larger" than the block-length n) with causal symbol errors. Dey et al. [6] demonstrate that the capacity of this problem equals 1 − 2 p (attained via computationally efficient codes), which is the same as the capacity of an omniscient adversary (attained by Reed-Solomon codes, and impossibility of higher rates follows by the Singleton bound). 4 This demonstrates that the penalty imposed by the causality condition on Calvin diminishes with increasing alphabet size.
Also related to this work is the study of Mazumdar [20] in which the capacity of memoryless channels where the adversary makes his decisions based only on the value of the currently transmitted bit is addressed. We note that the causal model is also a variant of the AVC model [11] , [21] , however previous works on AVCs with capacity characterizations do not relate directly to the study at hand on causal adversaries.
C. Proof Technique
To prove Theorem I.1 we demonstrate two results: a converse (by analyzing an attack strategy similar to that presented in [9] , [10] , and [17] ) and a novel coding scheme. Throughout, we denote the encoder by Alice, the decoder by Bob, and the adversarial causal jammer by Calvin.
1) Converse:
To prove Theorem I.1 we must present a strategy for Calvin that does not allow communication at rate higher than C (no matter which encoding/decoding scheme is used by Alice and Bob). Specifically, the strategy we present will allow Calvin to enforce a constant probability of error bounded away from zero whenever Alice and Bob communicate at rate higher than C. Calvin uses a two-phase babble-and-push strategy.
In the first phase Calvin "babbles" by behaving like a q-ary symmetric channel in which at mostpn symbols are changed. There is an adversarial attack of Calvin for anyp ≤ p, but it is "strongest" for an optimalp that depends on the setting of q, p, and p * . This fact is what accounts for the minimization in the capacity term given in Theorem I.1. The value ofp also determines the length, denoted here by b, of the babble phase, namely when Calvin stops behaving like a q-ary symmetric channel and starts his second "push" phase. Asp is taken to be at most p, in this first phase, Calvin only uses his error capabilities (and does not erase any symbols).
In the second phase of n − b channel uses, Calvin randomly selects a codeword from Alice and Bob's codebook which is consistent with what Bob has received so far. Namely, a codeword that from Bob's perspective may have been transmitted (when taking into account Calvin's attack). Calvin then "pushes" the remaining part of Alice's codeword towards his selected codeword. The push phase includes both errors and erasures on Calvin's behalf. Specifically, Calvin first imposes an error (with probability 1/2) on every entry x i of the transmitted codeword that differs from that chosen by Calvin x i , changing x i to x i . This operation pushes the transmitted codeword towards the codeword selected by Calvin. Once Calvin has exhausted his budget of pn errors, he moves to erasures and erases any entry x i that differs from x i . If Calvin's p * n budget allows him to erase all such symbols, by symmetrization techniques (e.g., [9] ) we show that with constant probability Bob is unable to determine whether Alice transmitted her codeword or the one chosen by Calvin, causing a decoding error with probability 1/2 in this case. To prove our bound, the remaining budget of Calvin (of errors and erasures) in the push phase must suffice to push the codeword of Alice half the distance towards that chosen by Calvin. Using the q-ary Plotkin bound [22] and some additional ideas, one can show that with constant probability the distance between these two codewords on the locations of the push phase is at most (1 − 1/q)(n − b), implying that Calvin needs a remaining budget for the last n − b channel uses in which the number of erasures plus twice the number of errors is at least (1 − 1/q)(n − b). Roughly speaking, calculations show that for everyp ≤ p there is a corresponding threshold b for which Calvin's budget suffices for the push phase. However, one would like b to be "just long enough". Setting b to be too small will shorten the babble phase of Calvin and will increase the block length of the push phase and as such will increase the budget needed by Calvin to overcome the potential distance of (1 − 1/q)(n − b) between his and Alice's codeword. Too long of a babble phase makes Calvin's attack look more similar to the output of a random channel, resulting in a weaker outer bound. All in all, the threshold b is set to be the minimal value possible that still leaves Calvin with a sufficient "push" budget.
Given p, p * , q andp the parameter b is set to roughly the value α q (p) n (specified in Theorem I.1) which implies that the babble phase behaves like a q-ary symmetric channel with error parameterp/α q (p) (recall that in the babble phase Calvin is changingpn randomly chosen locations out of the b locations in the phase). Hence, the upper bound obtained in this case is the rate of the corresponding q-ary symmetric channel with block length b = α q (p) n, which is exactly that stated in the term of Theorem I.1.
As we will see shortly in our achievability scheme, setting the rate just below the upper bound (for optimalp) allows us to overcome Calvin's pushing capabilities and as such allows successful communication, implying a tight characterization of the capacity for our online model.
2) Achievability:
In our codes the encoder Alice uses internal randomness (not known to Bob or Calvin) in the choice of the transmitted codeword, designed to allow a high probability of successful communication no matter which message Alice is sending to Bob. 5 We use "chunked random codes" described shortly. That is, we pick our codes uniformly at random from a random ensemble specified in Section II, and prove that w.h.p. 5 While we cannot prove it, we conjecture that encoder stochasticity is necessary for strategies that attain the rate-region specified above. Our intuition for our reasoning is as follows: if a "good" deterministic code of rate R were to be used, then after (noiselessly) observing about n R bits transmitted by Alice, Calvin would with high probability be able to infer Alice's message, and therefore infer her transmitted codeword. This would enable him to design a more effective jamming strategy for subsequent transmitted bits than the "babble-and-push" strategy described in [9] and [10] , and extended in Appendix A of this work. As supplementary evidence for this conjecture, we note that for certain AVCs [19] with strictly causal adversaries (i.e., Calvin's action for bit x i depends on x 1 through x i−1 , but not on x i ), there is indeed provably a gap between rates achievable via deterministic codes, and those achievable via stochastic codes.
over the code distribution a code chosen at random allows reliable communication. The decoder involves two major phases: a list-decoding phase in which the decoder obtains a short list of messages that include the one transmitted; and a unique decoding phase in which the list is reduced to a single message. Roughly, Bob in his decoding process divides the received word into two parts -all symbols received up to a given time t * , and all symbols received afterwards. The list-decoding is done using the first part of the received word, and the process of unique decoding from the list is done using the second part.
Consider first the special case in which there are only erasures ( p = 0). In this case, given the parameter p * (that specifies the fraction of symbols that can be erased by the adversary) and the received word, the decoder Bob can pin-point the value of t * that will allow successful decoding. Specifically, for any adversarial behavior, we show the existence of a value t * that on one hand allows Bob to obtain a small list of messages from the first part of the received word; and on the other guarantees that the fraction of symbols erased by the adversary in the second part of the received word cannot suffice to confuse Bob between any two messages in the list he holds. Notice the duality between the parameter b of our upper bound and the parameter t * here. For our upper bound, we show for any code above rate C that there exists a threshold b for which (i) Bob cannot uniquely decode based on the first b received symbols and (ii) Calvin's remaining budget allows him to cause a decoding error by "pushing" in the last n − b codeword symbols. In our lower bound, for any rate below C we suggest a coding scheme and show that there exists a threshold t * for which Bob can list-decode based on the first t * received symbols and that Calvin does not have sufficient budget left to cause a decoding error in the remaining n − t * symbols. As the rate for list-decoding (in our lower bound) resembles that of the q-ary symmetric channel (in our upper bound) we obtain tight results.
The ability to list-decode is obtained using standard probabilistic arguments that take into account the block length t * and the number of erasures λ t * in the first part of the received word. The ability to uniquely decode from the obtained list involves a more delicate analysis which uses the stochastic nature of our encoding and the causality constraint on Calvin. In particular, we use the fact that the secret symbols used in the encoding of the first part of the codeword (up to position t * ) are independent of those used for the second part. This independence is useful in separating the two decoding phases in the sense that the casual adversary at time t * is acting with no knowledge whatsoever on the secret symbols used by Alice after time t * . This lack of knowledge sets the stage for the unique decoding phase.
We accommodate different potential values of t * by designing a stochastic encoding process in which different parts of the codewords rely on independent secret symbols of Alice. Namely, we divide the coding process into chunks. Each chunk is a random stochastic code of length nθ for a small parameter θ that uses independent randomness from Alice. The final code of Alice is a concatenation of all its chunks. The range for the trajectoryp t (the shared region between curves 3 and 4) as a function of t for q = 2, p = 1/8, p * = 0. In Section III, curves 3 and 4 will be referred to as the list-decoding condition and the energy-bounding condition (see equations (4) and (5)). We plot tp t (the "unnormalized" trajectory) for clarity. Our bounds are analytical, however the plot was made numerically using n = 4 × 10 4 . Curves 1 and 2 are extremal curves for Calvin's true corruption fraction p t . Horizontal line np opt (optimal p from upper bound) is given as reference. If Calvin were to follow the attack given in our upper bound proof, then p t = npopt topt (dashed line). In this casê p t = p t at point t opt (dotted vertical line). If Calvin follows a different attack strategy, i.e., tp t differs from the trajectory shown in this graph, the location in whichp t = p t will differ from the t opt in this graph.
Setting θ small enough allows enough flexibility to manage any possible value t * chosen by Bob's decoder.
The encoding and decoding process for the channel in the presence of both errors and erasures follow the same line of analysis as specified above for the erasure-only case, but with one major and significant difference. Bob does not know which symbols in the transmitted codeword were in error, and thus by studying the received word, Bob is not able to identify a location t * with the desired properties. To overcome this difficulty, we design an iterative decoding process in which Bob starts with a small value of t and performs an attempt to decode. As before the decoding process first list-decodes using the first part of the received word and then uniquely decodes.
The list-decoding is done according to a certain "guessed" valuep t for the fraction of symbol errors in the first part of the received word. Here,p t is a carefully designed function of t (also referred to as a "trajectory") that is fixed and known to all parties involved in the communication. The trajectorŷ p t is chosen in a way that guarantees successful decoding for any location t for whichp t equals the fraction of symbols p t actually changed by Calvin up to location t (with respect to unerased positions). Specifically,p t guarantees that Bob is able to obtain a small list of messages by list-decoding up to position t and to uniquely decode from this list as the remaining corruption power of Calvin is limited. Analyzing these conditions gives a range of possible trajectoriesp t depicted in Figure 3 and defined in detail in Section III. Now that we havep t , we show that the iterative decoding of Bob is successful at threshold location t if indeedp t = p t , otherwise, we show that the unique decoding phase will fail in the sense that Bob will not receive any message from the decoding process. Identifying a failure in the decoding process, Bob increases t and repeats the decoding attempt. The crux of our analysis lies in our proof that eventually, no matter what the behavior of Calvin is, there will be a value of t, denoted t * , for whichp t * is (approximately) p t * and the decoding succeeds. Establishing the existence of the trajectorŷ p t as discussed above and proving that at some point it must be close to p t is a central part of our proof.
D. Structure
In Section II we formally present the channel model, the encoder, and the decoding process. In addition, we present a careful description of the adversarial behavior. Section III presents the achievability of Theorem I.1. Section A of the Appendix presents the converse of Theorem I.1 (which is based on that appearing in [9] and [10] , and modified here to include both errors and erasures, and to hold for large alphabets). 
II. MODEL

A. Channel Model
together with the sequence of all previous channel outputs up
The functions Adv i must satisfy the adversarial power constraint, namely that the total number of errors and erasures does not exceed pn and p * n, respectively.
B. Random Code Distribution
We now define a distribution over codes. In our proof, we use this distribution to claim the existence of a fixed code that allows reliable communication between Alice and Bob over the channel model. In our code construction R denotes the code rate, S the private secret rate of the encoder (to be defined explicitly shortly), and θ a "quantization" parameter (specified below).
Let U = q n R denote Alice's message set and S = q nS be the set of private random secrets available only to Alice. The encoder randomness S is neither shared with the receiver nor the adversary. Let be the uniform distribution over stochastic codes U × S → X nθ , i.e., for every message m ∈ U and private randomness s ∈ S, the corresponding codeword x nθ ∈ X nθ is chosen uniformly at random from q nθ . Let C 1 , C 2 , · · · , C 1/θ be stochastic codes, which are i.i.d. according to the probability distribution . Specifically, ∀i ∈ [1/θ ], the corresponding stochastic code is a map C i : U × S → X nθ chosen from the distribution . The codebooks C 1 , · · · , C 1/θ are known publicly by all parties (Alice, Bob, and Calvin) prior to communication. Here and throughout we consider expressions such as n R, nS, and 1 θ as integers (minor modifications in the proof allow us to remove this assumption).
C. Encoder
Given a message m ∈ U and 1/θ secrets, s 1 , s 2 , · · · , s 1/θ each in S, a codeword of length n with respect to the message m and the 1/θ secrets is defined to be the concatenation of 1/θ chunks of sub-codewords,
where C i (m, s i ) is the i -th sub-codeword in the entire codeword, and • denotes the concatenation between two chunks of sub-codewords. To distinguish the concatenated code C from the code for a chunk, we will call
Our code analysis then focuses on two different parts of the entire code, defined as follows.
t ∈ T . A code prefix of C with respect to t is the concatenation of the first t nθ sub-codes of C. A code suffix of C with respect to t is the concatenation of the last
In our analysis, it is convenient to describe the encoding scheme of Alice in a causal manner. Namely, we will assume that the secret value s i corresponding to the encoding of the i -th chunk is chosen by Alice immediately before the i -th chunk is to be transmitted and no sooner.
As mentioned above, we show that with positive probability, the code C chosen at random based on the distribution above has certain properties that allow reliable communication over our channel model.
D. Decoding Process
The decoding process of Bob is done in an iterative manner. Specifically, let λ t be the number of erasures Bob receives after t channel uses. Upon receiving the entire codeword with errors and erasures, for some fixed > 0, Bob identifies the smallest value of t − λ t ≥ n 1 − corresponding to the (end) location of a chunk, and attempts to correctly decode the transmitted message m based on the codeword prefix and suffix with respect to position t. The decoding process is terminated if a message is decoded by Bob, otherwise the value of t is increased by nθ (the chunk size) and Bob attempts to decode again. This process continues until t reaches (approximately) the end of the codeword. If no decoding succeeds until then, a decoder error is declared.
Each attempt of decoding can be divided into two phases. First, at each position t, Bob chooses an estimatep t for the fraction of errors (with respect to the unerased positions) used by Calvin in the codeword prefix up to t = knθ . In our proof to come, we show thatp t satisfies two important conditions, the list-decoding condition and the energy-bounding condition (see Claim III.7). The list-decoding condition allows Bob to decode the codeword prefix Next, for the second phase, the energy-bounding condition states that, ifp t equals p t , the total amount of erasures and twice the amount of symbol errors is no more than (n − t)
in the codeword suffix with respect to position t. Therefore, as we will show, Bob can use a natural consistency decoder (defined below) to determine whether to stop or continue the decoding process. More precisely, the decoding process continues if the consistency decoder fails to return a message and stops if a messagem is decoded from the messages in L. The decoder also stops when t − λ t has reached size n −−1 np * − nθ , where λ t is the number of erasures up to position t.
be two word suffixes with respect to position t. The word suffix y t is consistent with the word suffix y t if and only if the number of erasures plus twice the number of unerased positions in which y t does not agree with y
t is no more than (n −t) Formally, the decoder process of Bob can be described as follows. Essentially, we will use the following definition of p t (the estimate to Calvin's error corruption fraction with respect to unerased positions at time t used by Bob), which is slightly revised later in Definition III.3 to be more robust to slight slacknesses that appear in the analysis. Let p ∈ 0,
Definition II.3. A consistency decoder applied to a code suffix
The value ofp t is 0 for all t up to n 1 − 
E. The Decoding Algorithm
The decoding rules for the case where p is strictly larger than zero are described as follows. (If there are only erasures, i.e., p = 0, a slightly simplified decoding is given in Section III-G.2.) In what follows and throughout, recall that > 0 is a design parameter chosen to be sufficiently small. 1. Identify the position t = t 0 = k 0 nθ for some integer k 0 , where t 0 is the smallest integer such that
with respect to position t to obtain a list L of messages of size L, with the list-decoding radius (t − λ t )p t . More precisely, a message m is in the list L if there is a codeword corresponding to m for which its unerased symbols in the codeword prefix with respect to position t is of distance no more than (t − λ t )p t from the corresponding unerased symbols in the received prefix.
3. Verify the codeword suffixes with respect to position t corresponding to messages in the list L through a consistency decoder. Specifically, consider the unerased symbols in the suffix (call the collection of these unerased symbols the "punctured" suffix) and the Hamming balls with radius equal to (n − t)
centered at the codeword suffix ("punctured" in positions corresponding to the erased positions of the received suffix) of each codeword corresponding to the messages in the list L. If the "punctured" suffix is outside all the balls, increase t by nθ and goto Step (2) . If the "punctured" suffix lies in exactly one of the balls, decode to the messagê m corresponding to the center of the ball. If the "punctured" suffix lies in more than one ball a decoding error is declared.
For every message m, Bob decodes correctly if his estimatê m equals m. Let t * be the first time t in which the "punctured" suffix discussed above lies in exactly one of the balls corresponding to messages in the list L, and this ball corresponds to the message m. We show that this indeed happens w.h.p. over the random secrets S n−t * nθ used by Alice for the codeword suffix with respect to position t * . If Bob's estimatem is not equal to m, Bob is said to make a decoding error. The probability of error for a message m is defined as the probability over Alice's private secrets s ∈ S that Bob decodes incorrectly. The (maximum) probability of error for the code C is defined as the maximum of the probabilities of error for message m over all messages m ∈ U.
Definition II.4 (Code Rate).
A rate R is said to be achievable if for every ξ > 0, β > 0 and every sufficiently large n there exists a code of block length n that allows Alice to communicate q n(R−β) distinct messages to Bob with probability of error at most ξ . The supremum over n of all achievable rates is the capacity C of the channel.
F. Adversarial Behavior
The behavior of Calvin is specified by the channel model above. In particular, we are interested in how Calvin corrupts a codeword with errors, which can be characterized by the function p t defined below which specifies how many errors were injected by Calvin up to position t normalized by the number of unerased positions. We refer to p t as a trajectory, and note that the exact trajectory used by Calvin is not known to the decoder Bob. In our lower bound analysis we assume that Calvin has certain capabilities that may be beyond those available to a causal adversary. This is without loss of generality in the study of lower bounds (i.e., achievability schemes). We assume that the trajectory ofp t that Bob uses in his decoding process is known to Calvin. This implies (as we will show) that Calvin knows the position t * that Bob eventually stops his decoding process. In addition, we assume that the list of messages obtained through Bob's list-decoding process can be determined explicitly by Calvin. Moreover, we assume that Calvin knows the message m a priori.
At every list-decoding position t = knθ , we stress that the subsequent secrets, namely, (s k+1 , s k+2 , · · · , s 1/θ ) for the codeword suffix are unknown to Calvin. Indeed, given the causal nature of Alice's encoding, these secrets have not even been chosen by Alice at this point in time. The fact that the secrets are hidden from Calvin implies that (s k+1 , s k+2 , · · · , s 1/θ ) are completely independent of the list (obtained through Bob's list-decoding) L determined by Calvin. This fact is crucial to our analysis.
Also, we strengthen Calvin by allowing him to choose which symbols to corrupt after position t * = k * nθ noncausally. Namely, we assume that Calvin chooses his corruption pattern after looking ahead to all the remaining symbols of the transmitted codeword. As we show, no matter how these corruptions are chosen, the codeword suffix has at most (n − t * )
symbols in error. The fact that the distribution of (s k * +1 , s k * +2 , · · · , s 1/θ ) is independent of the list L will allow us to show that Bob succeeds in his decoding.
III. PROOF OF THEOREM I.1: ACHIEVABILITY
We start by summarizing the structure of our proof and by presenting a brief description of several definitions and claims. The detailed presentations of the definitions and claims/proofs are followed by our summary. We depict the flow of our claims, corollaries, and theorems in Figure 4 . All parameters used throughout this section appear in Table I (located at the end of the manuscript) for reference. 6. Summary and proof of achievability of Theorem I.1
Preliminary definitions and technical claims
• Claim III.24: With high probability our code C possesses the needed properties.
• Claim III.26: With high probability Bob succeeds in decoding.
• Theorem III.27: Achievability of Theorem I.1 (channel capacity).
Let > 0 and q ≥ 2. Throughout, is a constant design parameter that can be considered to be arbitrarily small.
Let p ∈ 0,
be the fraction of symbol errors and
be the fraction of symbol erasures such that
q the stated capacity is 0). The special cases of p = 0 and p * = 0 are addressed in Section III-G.
In the following, unless otherwise specified, H (X) refers to source entropy for symbols (or q-ary entropy), which is obtained through normalizing the standard binary entropy by a factor of log q, and H q (x) refers to the q-ary entropy function, namely,
We use the code construction, encoder, and decoder outlined in Section II with rate R = C − for capacity C of Theorem I.1. Assume the received word y ∈ Y n has np symbol errors and np * erasures (otherwise, one may model the adversarial behavior by parameters p < p or p * < p * ). For any t ∈ T , let λ t be the number of erasures in y up to position t. Let t 0 = k 0 nθ ∈ T be the smallest integer such
4q 2 be the secret rate, namely, q nS is the size of the set S of secrets available to Alice.
A. Preliminaries
Our analysis of Bob's decoding begins with selecting a decoding reference trajectoryp t (Definition III.3 below) as a proxy trajectory for Calvin's trajectory p t . Recall that for each t, p t is the fraction of errors (with respect to unerased positions) in the codeword prefix up to t, and accordingly,p t is the fraction of symbols (with respect to unerased positions) that Bob assumes are in errors up to position t. In general, the trajectoriesp t and p t are not equal. We will show in Claim III.7 that follows, that for t − λ t ≥ n 1 − the selected decoding reference trajectoryp t satisfies two important conditions, the list-decoding condition (4) and the energy-bounding condition (5) introduced below.
The list-decoding condition guarantees a small list size if decoding is done with radius (t − λ t )p t ; and the energy-bounding condition bounds from above the remaining errors that the adversary has for the codeword suffix if Bob's estimatep t to p t is approximately correct. To prove correctness of our decoding procedure, we must introduce a new trajectoryp t , which is closely related to its counterpartp t in the sense thatp t approximately equalsp t , but the former is slightly smaller than the latter. This parameter is introduced to allow robustness in our analysis which absorbs certain slacknesses that are a result of our code construction and analysis technique (e.g., such as the fact that our chunk size nθ cannot be made too small). We here give our precise definitions, which can be at times better understood intuitively if the reader keeps the above discussion in mind. 
Moreover, note that it holds that t − λ t = nα q (p t ). 
Definition III.4 (Trajectory Type
We note that for our definitions it holds thatp t <p t . Namely, α q (p t ) ≤ 2 implies that (n − t)/2 ≤ n/α q (p t ) and thus,
We start with the following technical lemma, proven in Section C of the Appendix. (4) and (5) .
B. The List-Decoding and Energy-Bounding Properties
Claim III.7 Let α q (p) = 1 − 2q q−1 ( p −p) −−1 p * wherē p ∈ [0, p]. Let C = min p∈[0, p] α q (p) 1 − H q p α q (p) and R = C − . Then for any t ∈ T such that (t − λ t ) ∈ n 1 − 2q q−1 p −−1 p * − 2 4 , n 1 −−1 p * ,p t ∈ [0, 1 − 1/q] of Defintion III.3 satisfies equations
Proof.
For brevity, we first observe that (4) and dividing both sides by n, we need to prove:
We substitute (7) intop t in the left hand side (LHS) of (9) to get
≥ min
where (10) follows from Lemma III.6, (11) follows by 2+ln (q−1) ln q < 3 for q ≥ 2, and (12) follows from /q +/4 < for any q ≥ 2.
where (13) follows from Lemma III.6 with x = 0, and
< 3 for q ≥ 2; and the last inequality follows by settingp = 0.
Thus far we have satisfied condition (4) in our claim. To see condition (5), we substitute (7) intop t in the LHS of (5), and note that for
where (14) follows by substituting (6) intop t .
. Therefore,
where (17) follows by (15) .
C. Establishing the Existence of Correct Decoding Point
We now establish the existence of a position t * for correct decoding. Specifically, for t * we require that p t * satisfies the energy-bounding condition (which is central to the proof of successful decoding as it bounds the remaining error budget of Calvin). For any Low Type Trajectory (i.e., p t 0 <p t 0 , see Definition III.4), we set t * = t 0 = k 0 nθ and prove the energy-bounding condition in Claim III.12 below. For any High Type Trajectory of Calvin (i.e., p t 0 ≥p t 0 , see Definition III.4), we show in Claim III.9 below that p t always intersects withp t at some point t after t 0 no matter what corruption pattern is chosen by Calvin (i.e., at point t, Bob's estimatep t is equal to the actual amount of errors p t ). Moreover, by Claim III.10 and Claim III.11 below, this implies a value t * (the chunk end which falls immediately after the intersection point t above) for which it is guaranteed that the remaining error budget of Calvin is low and satisfies the energy-bounding condition. Specifically, we will set t * as the smallest value in T such that p t * −nθ >p t * −nθ and p t * ≤p t * . As the intersection point between p t andp t may occur in a position t that is not a chunk endpoint (i.e., the intersection position is not in T ), our analysis uses p t as a lower bound on how much p t changes until t is a chunk endpoint. To summarize: We first argue that t * as defined above in (ii) indeed exists by showing thatp t must eventually be greater than p t .
Claim III.9. If t − λ
Proof. For sufficiently small (and thus θ ), we have
.
where (18) follows by α q (p t ) = (t − λ t ) /n and (19) follows by substituting the expression ofp t .
On the other hand, the number of errors (t − λ t ) p t imposed on the codeword up to time t is no more than the total number of errors np.
We now show that as long as p t −nθ >p t −nθ then p t >p t . This will imply p t * >p t * for our definition of t * .
Claim III.10. For any t ∈ T and (t
Proof. Note that we have
where (20) follows from the definition of p t , (21) follows by using the fact that p t −nθ >p t −nθ , (22) follows by substituting the expression ofp t and realizing that both t − λ t and t − nθ − λ t −nθ are in n 1 − On the other hand, sincep t <p 
Next, we consider the difference betweenp t and p t .
, and thus,
where (27) follows by the definition ofp t .
where (27) follows since f (t − λ t ) ≤p t −nθ and (29) We now show that p t >p t implies the energy-bounding condition
which in turn establishes the energy-bounding condition for our choice of t * in High Type Trajectories.
Claim III.11. Let p h be the portion of symbol errors in the received word y with respect to the unerased positions between position t + 1 and n for
(t − λ t ) ∈ n 1 − 2q q−1 p −−1 p * − 2 4 , n 1 −−1 p * . If p t >p t , then p h < q−1 2q − (n−t ) 2 18q 2 (n−t −np * +λ t ) − np * −λ t 2q(n−t −np * +λ t ) , which in turn implies that np * − λ t +2 (np − (t − λ t ) p t )+ (n − t) 2 9q 2 ≤ (q − 1)(n − t) q .
Proof. By the definition of p h , we have
where (29) follows by (8) and α q (p t ) = (t − λ t )/n and (30) follows by (6) . Using the fact that p h (n − t − (np * − λ t )) = np − (t − λ t ) p t and multiplying both sides of (31) by (n − t − (np * − λ t )) we have
Therefore,
We now show the energy-bounding condition for the setting of t * in Low Type Trajectories. 
where (33) follows by using nθ = 
D. List Decoding Properties
We now study the list-decoding properties of our random code construction. We will need an upper bound on the volume of a Hamming ball, given by the following lemma and proven for completeness in Appendix D.
Lemma III.13. Let F be an alphabet of size q ≥ 2. For
0 ≤ p ≤ 1 − 1/q, the
number of vectors of length n over F in a Hamming ball of radius np is
Claim III.14. Let > 0 and S = 
≥ n R, then with probability at least 1 − q − over code design, the code
is list-decodable for (t − λ t )p t symbol errors and λ t erasures with list size
Proof. The proof follows ideas in [23, Th. 10.3] , and is modified slightly to correspond to stochastic codes. We stress that although the code is stochastic and each message corresponds to several codewords, we analyze the number L of different messages with codewords that fall into a Hamming ball of limited radius. The number of potential codewords in k chunks is q nθ k = q knθ = q t . Asp t ≤ 1 − 1/q, by Lemma III.13, the number of words of length (t − λ t ) in a Hamming ball of radius (t − λ t )p t is at most
We study the number of different messages corresponding to codewords that may lie in such a ball. Each message m corresponds to at most q nS/θ codewords. Since the encoding of each message is independent of other messages, the probability that there exist L > L messages, each with at least one corresponding codeword of length (t − λ t ) such that the corresponding L codewords lie in the Hamming ball of radius (t − λ t )p t centered at a received word of length (t − λ t ) is at most
Thus, the probability that any received word of k chunks is list-decoded to a list of size greater than L is at most
To quantify (33), we use log q t λ t ≤ t H 2 λ t t + c log q t for sufficiently large constant c and study
Hence, solving (34) for L we have
Therefore, if L satisfies (35) the code 
over code design, for any t such that (t
− λ t ) 1 − H q (p t ) − n 4 ≥ n R, the code C 1 • C 2 • · · · • C k
is L-list decodable for (t − λ t )p t symbol errors and λ t erasures with list size
Proof. By Claim III.14, with probability 1−q −3 log q n the code
Therefore, the probability that the code is decoded to a list of size greater than L is at most q −3 log q n = 1 n 3 . Since k < n and (t − λ t )p t < t − λ t < n, the probability that the code
Here, we use the fact that t − λ t + 3 log q n +
t H 2 λ t t
+ O(log q t) ≤ n + n + 3n + n = 6n.
E. Utilizing the Energy-Bounding Condition
Unless otherwise specified, for any t ∈ T = {nθ, 2nθ, · · · , n − nθ }, integer k = t nθ is the number of chunks in the prefix of a code (or codeword) with respect to position t and integer l = We recall Bob's decoding scheme from Section II. Bob starts decoding at position t 0 and continues to decode at subsequent chunk ends until a message is returned by the consistency decoder or until Bob reaches the end of the received word. Claim III.14 and Corollary III.15 above guarantee that Bob in his first phase of decoding will always obtain a list of messages of list size L = O 1 from the list-decoder no matter what position t is currently being considered. The analysis in Claim III.14 and Corollary III.15 and in the claims to come is w.h.p. over our random code construction. Moreover, for any t, the energy-bounding condition (5) implies that, in the case ofp t ≥ p t >p t for High Type Trajectories, the unused errors left for Calvin are less than (n − t)
We start by studying the case in which the current iteration of Bob satisfies t = t * as defined in Definition III.8 (which implies thatp t ≥ p t >p t for High Type Trajectories). In Claim III.20, Claim III.21, and Claim III.23 below we show that if t = t * Calvin's remaining error budget is not sufficient to mislead the consistency decoder, and will allow unique decoding from the list of messages Bob holds. Namely, we show that with high probability over the secret random symbols of Alice used in the encoding process, our code design guarantees that the only message in our list that is consistent with the transmitted codeword is the one transmitted by Alice.
More precisely, consider the consistency checking phase of Bob in the iteration in which t = t * . In this iteration we know (via the energy-bounding condition (5)) that the number of unused errors of Calvin is less than (n − t * )
. At this point in time, Bob holds a small list of messages L that has been (implicitly) determined by Calvin, and via the consistency decoder wishes to find the unique message m in the list that was transmitted. For any transmitted message m, as the list is small, we can guarantee that with high probability over our code design most of the codeword suffixes corresponding to m are roughly of distance
q from any codeword suffix of any other message in the list L, which in turn implies, given the bound on Calvin's remaining error budget, that decoding will succeed. However, this analysis is misleading as one must overcome the adversarial choice of L in establishing correct decoding. (We note that a naïve use of the union bound does not suffice to overcome all potential lists L.)
For successful decoding regardless of Calvin's adversarial behavior, we use the randomness in Alice's stochastic encoding (not known a priori to Calvin) and the fact that Calvin is causal. Recall that every message m can be encoded into several codewords based on the randomness of Alice. Let s le f t and s right be the collection of Alice's random symbols used up to and after position t * respectively. When Calvin (perhaps partially) determines the list L we may assume that he has full knowledge of s le f t . However by his causal nature he has no knowledge regarding s right . As the list L is obtained at position t * by Bob, we may now take advantage of the fact that it is independent of the randomness s right used by Alice. Specifically, instead of considering a single codeword in our analysis that corresponds to m we consider the family of codewords that on one hand all share a specific s le f t (which corresponds to Calvin's view up to position t * ) but have different s right . From Calvin's perspective at position t * , all codewords in this family are equivalent and completely match his view so far. Using a family of codewords that are independent of L in our analysis, and allowing the decoding to fail on a small fraction of them, enables us to amplify the success rate of our decoding procedure to the extent that it can be used in the needed union bound. Specifically, without such an amplification, the error exponent of O(n) in the decoding process for a given list L would not suffice to obtain a low error probability in decoding by applying the union bound over all potential lists. Our full analysis is given in Claim III.20, Claim III.21, and Claim III.23 below.
We now address the case t = t * . In this case, by our definitions, it holds that we are in a High Type Trajectory of Calvin and that p t >p t >p t . When t = t * we show that the decoding process of Bob will not return any codewords at all (as all messages in the list will fail the consistency test). In this case, we continue with the next value of t (the next chunk end).
We summarize all the properties of our code in Claim III.24 given below. With those properties established, through Bob's iterative decoder we show in Claim III.26 that Bob is able to correctly decode the transmitted message m w.h.p. over the randomness of Alice. Finally, in Theorem III.27 we show that the channel capacity C claimed is indeed achievable.
We start with a number of formal definitions. We now analyze the probability that a code is good with respect to the definitions above. We will need an upper bound on the q-ary entropy function in the neighborhood of 1 − 1/q, stated below and proven in Appendix E. Proof.
is of distance d from a set of codeword suffixes if the Hamming distance between the suffix
C k+1 (m, s k+1 ) • C k+2 (m, s k+2 ) • · · · • C 1/θ m,
Lemma III.19. For small enough θ > 0,
. Define the forbidden region with respect to the list L(m) as
where B (x i , r ) is the Hamming ball with center x i and radius
We depict the notion of the forbidden region in Figure 5 .
Since the size of the list L(m) is L(m), by Lemma III.13, the number of words of length (n − t) in the forbidden region
where (36) follows by Lemma III.19 with θ = 2 9q 2 . For sufficiently large n and S = θ 3 4q 2 , we have for some constant c that
where (39) follows since q 3 > 8 ln q for any q ≥ 2. It follows that log q L(m)
Substituting (39) into (37), we have s k+1 , s k+2 , · · · , s 1/θ ). Therefore, the probability over
Claim III.21. With probability larger than 1 − q −n 2 over code design, a code suffix Proof. Let S = q nS be the set of integers between 0 and q nS − 1. We start by considering a partition of the set of codeword suffixes corresponding to message m into |S| l−1 disjoint subsets. Specifically, we partition the set of secrets S l into |S| l−1 disjoint sets. Each set is indexed by an element
where addition is done modulo q nS . It holds that
Let s * ∈ S l−1 . In our analysis below we use the fact that any two distinct l-tuples s = (s k+1 , s k+2 , . . . , s 1/θ ) and s = (s k+1 , s k+2 , . . . , s 1/θ ) in S l that appear in S s * have the property that all their coordinates differ. Namely that , s k+2 , . . . , s 1/θ ) from a certain set S s * in the partition specified above. Each such codeword suffix consists of l chunks. By our construction, the set of q nS codeword suffixes corresponding to s = (s k+1 , s k+2 , . . . , s 1/θ ) ∈ S s * are independent and uniformly distributed. This follows directly from our code construction and the property of S s * discussed above. Thus, for s = (s k+1 , s k+2 , . . . ,
is not good with respect to message m, the list L(m), and the secrets (s k+1 , s k+2 , · · · , s 1/θ ) is independent from the event that a code suffix C k+1 • C k+2 • · · · • C 1/θ is not good with respect to message m, the list L(m), and the secrets
From Claim III.20, a code suffix C k+1 • C k+2 • · · · • C 1/θ is not good with respect to message m, the list L(m), and a sequence of secrets (s k+1 , s k+2 , · · · , s 1/θ ) with probability less than q −(n−t )δ . Thus, the probability that a code suffix C k+1 • C k+2 • · · · • C 1/θ is not good with respect to message m, the list L(m), and a certain σ portion of sequences of l secrets in the set S s * is less than
The number of all possible σ -portions of the set S s * is
where (41) follows by H 2 (σ ) < −2σ log σ for σ < 1/2. We say that a code suffix C k+1 • C k+2 • · · · • C 1/θ is σ -good with respect to message m, the list L(m) of codeword suffixes, and a secret set S s * , if the code suffix C k+1 • C k+2 • · · · • C 1/θ is good with respect to the message m, the list L(m), and a (1 − σ ) portion of sequences of secrets in the set S s * . So the probability over code design that a code suffix
where ( Now union bounding over all sets S s * in the partition of S l , we get for sufficiently large n that
Finally, we notice that being σ -good with respect to a message m, a list L(m) of codeword suffixes, and any secret set S s * in the partition of S l implies being σ -good with respect to message m and list L(m). Hence, the probability over code design that a code suffix C k+1 • C k+2 • · · · • C 1/θ is σ -good with respect to message m and list L(m) is
Remark III.22. Proof. The number of possible lists of codewords L(m) that can be obtained at a certain chunk end position t depends on a set of messages L of size at most c/ for some constant c and is thus of size at most
From Claim III.21 we know that for σ = q −nθ 4 , the probability that a code suffix C k+1 • C k+2 • · · · • C 1/θ is σ -good with respect to all message m, any list L(m), and every chunk end position t is at least
for sufficiently large n.
F. Summary: Putting It All Together
Claim III.24. With probability at least 1 − 1 n − q −n over code design, the resulting code C has the property that for any adversarial error and erasure patterns, there exists a position t * = k * nθ such that:
• The code prefix with respect to position t * , Proof. We consider all error and erasure patterns of the adversary by analyzing all of Calvin's trajectories. More precisely, given any erasure pattern, we analyze Calvin's possible behaviors p t on the (t − λ t ) unerased symbol positions. As mentioned above, all trajectories of Calvin can be classified into two types, the High Type Trajectory and the Low Type Trajectory, based on the value of p t 0 .
For any Low Type Trajectory, we have p t 0 <p t 0 , and therefore (t 0 − λ t 0 ) p t 0 < (t 0 − λ t 0 )p t 0 . Let t * = t 0 = k 0 nθ for some integer k 0 . By our choice ofp t , the listdecoding condition (4) is always satisfied (Claim III.7). Thus, by Corollary III.15, with list-decoding radius (t 0 − λ t 0 )p t 0 , the code prefix, 
So far the first property stated in the claim is satisfied for any Low Type Trajectory.
By Claim III.12, p t 0 ≥ 0 satisfies the energy-bounding condition (5), i.e., we have that the total amount of erasures and twice the amount of errors in the suffix is
is σ -good with respect to message m and list L(m) with probability 1 − q −n over code design. Hence, for any Low Type Trajectory, our code design possesses the two properties stated in the claim. Moreover, in this case we have t * = t 0 .
For any High Type Trajectory, we have p t 0 ≥p t 0 . By Claim III.9, given any trajectory p t of High Type, the trajectory p t always intersects withp t no later than the position t = λ t +n−−1 np * −nθ . Let t * be the chunk end immediately after (or precisely at) the intersection point, at which p t * ≤p t * (which implies p t * −nθ >p t * −nθ >p t * −nθ ). Let t = knθ ≤ t * . Then at any position t, by Corollary III.15, with list-decoding radius (t−λ t )p t , the code prefix 
, is σ -good with respect to message m and list L(m) with probability 1 − q −n over code design. Thus, for any High Type Trajectory, both the properties in the claim are also satisfied by our code design.
In conclusion, the probability that the code C possesses the two properties is at least 1 − 
and R = C − . For any message m ∈ U and its corresponding encoding x ∈ X n using the code established in Claim III.24 and the encoder of Section II, the decoding procedures described in Section II allows Bob to correctly decode the message m with probability at least 1 − nq −nθ 4 over the random secrets s ∈ S available to Alice.
Proof. A decoding error occurs if the consistency decoder fails to return a single message or if the decoder returns a message that is not equal to the transmitted message. Consider t * of Claim III.24. For all decoding times t strictly less than t * , the second property of Claim III.24 implies that the consistency check in the decoding process will not return any message (with probability 1 − σ over the randomness of the encoding). More precisely, by our definition of t * (Definition III.8) and our iterative decoding process, for any t strictly less that t * , we have p t >p t . Since our list-decoding radius is (t − λ t )p t , the list we obtain from the list-decoding phase will not include the transmitted message. This in turn implies that with probability at least 1 − σ the consistency decoder will not return any message. Namely, with probability at least 1 − σ the sequence of l secrets used in the codeword suffix is not chosen from the particular σ portion of S l that may cause a decoding failure. Similarly, at time t * , with the same probability, the consistency check of the decoding process will return the correct message (as now p t * ≤p t * and the transmitted message will be included in the list-decoding phase).
From Claim III.23, we have σ = q −nθ 4 . Therefore, the probability of successful decoding is at least
We conclude with the proof of the achievability of Theorem I.1:
Theorem III.27. The capacity C of q-ary causal adversarial channels with symbol errors and erasures is at least
where
Let ξ > 0 and β > 0. The achievability proof follows from Claim III.26. Specifically, for sufficiently large n it holds by Claim III.26 that the decoding error is bounded above by ξ . In addition, for sufficiently small , R = C − of Claim III.26 is at least C − β. Therefore, for sufficiently large n, q n R = q n(C−β) distinct messages can be reliably transmitted over our channel with error probability at most ξ . Hence, the channel capacity of q-ary causal adversarial channels with symbol errors and erasures is at least (45).
Remark: The scenario wherein Calvin has n lookahead can also be handled via our analysis above. Roughly, if we back off in our rate by the trajectoryp t gets shifted to the left by n. We then "sacrifice" n symbols to Calvin by demanding that a more stringent energy-bounding condition be satisfied, in which the block length of the second part (succeeding t * ) is reduced by n. With these tweaks, the remainder of the analysis of the n-lookahead codes is identical to that of the causal codes discussed above.
G. Discussion of Special Cases
In this section, we discuss several special cases of q-ary causal adversarial channels. We assume the converse of Theorem I.1 (proven in Section A of the Appendix) in the discussions below.
1) Symbol Error Channel: For q-ary causal adversarial channels with symbol errors only, the above analysis can get modified by setting p * = 0 and λ t = 0. The corresponding list-decoding and energy-bounding conditions become
By Corollary I.2, the corresponding channel capacity is
where ρ * ∈ 0,
2) Symbol Erasure Channel:
For q-ary causal adversarial channels with erasures only, there is no need for a decoding reference trajectoryp t since erasures are visible. Therefore, settingp t = 0, the list-decoding condition becomes
On the other hand, since there are only symbol erasures, i.e., p = 0, the corresponding energy-bounding condition becomes
It can be shown that there exists t * ∈ T and t * ∈ n 1 − 
where (51) follows since t * − λ t * ≥ n 1 − and (52) follows by < 1. In addition, we have
Therefore, there exists t * ∈ T and t * ∈ n 1 − 
Furthermore, since t * ∈ T , it suffices to show that t * satisfies
Notice that the left hand side of the above inequality is increasing in λ t * . Therefore, it suffices to show
Rearranging and simplifying the above inequality, we get
Now note that for q ≥ 2 and θ = 
Thus, there exists t * ≥ n 1 − + λ t * and t * ∈ T such that (54) holds. Together with (53), we conclude that there exists t * ∈ T and t * ∈ n 1 − The decoding rules can now be simplified as follows.
1'.
Identify the position t * = k * nθ for some integer k * such that the list-decoding condition (49) and the energy-bounding condition (50) are satisfied. 2'. List-decode the code prefix C 1 •C 2 •· · ·•C k * with respect to position t * . Namely, construct a list of all possible messages with corresponding codewords that are consistent with all unerased symbols of the received word up to position t * . 3'. Verify the codeword suffixes with respect to position t * corresponding to messages in the list L through a consistency decoder. Namely, as above, only messages with corresponding codewords that agree with all unerased symbols of the received suffix will be considered by the decoder. If there is only one such message, decode to that message. Otherwise declare a decoding error.
With these modified conditions and simplified decoding procedures, the corresponding channel capacity can be determined to be
3) Large Alphabet: For sufficiently large q, we have
. Here, the symbol ≈ hides o(1) additive terms when q tends to infinity. Then we obtain
On the other hand, we can also observe from Corollary I.2 that ρ * goes to zero as q tends to infinity, and the corresponding channel capacity is C = 1 − 2 p − p * as above. Hence, for sufficiently large alphabets, if the adversary has no erasure budget, i.e., p * = 0, the capacity is 1 − 2 p, which matches the one given in [6] . On the other hand, if the adversary only has erasure budget, i.e., p = 0, the capacity is 1 − p * .
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we obtain the capacity C for the q-ary causal channel for a combined corruption model in which the channel may impose at most pn errors and at most p * n erasures on the transmitted codeword. Given the significant difference between the capacities of causal adversaries (characterized in this work) and the n-delayed adversaries considered in [18] (with capacities equaling the corresponding random coding capacities) or the 1-bit delay erasure adversary considered in [19] (with capacity equaling 1− p * ), one open question that we do not address in this work is the question of characterizing the capacity of a nearly causal adversary, i.e., a delay of say some constant number of bits, or even just one bit in the general case of combined errors/erasures and general q-ary alphabets. Another promising direction for future research is whether the techniques of [13] to construct computationally efficient capacity-achieving codes for oblivious adversaries can be modified to construct corresponding capacity-achieving codes for causal adversaries. APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM I.1: CONVERSE Our proof is based on that appearing in [9] and [10] , and modified here to include both errors and erasures, and to hold for large alphabets. We start by presenting the "babbleand-push" attack. We then summarize several definitions and claims. The detailed presentations of the claims/proofs are followed by the summary. We depict the flow of our claims and theorems in Figure 6 .
Let q ≥ 2. Let p ∈ 0,
be the fraction of symbol errors and p * ∈ 0,
be the fraction of symbol erasures.
We now specify Calvin's "Babble-and-push" attack. 
where C b (m, s) is the first b symbols of C(m, s). Next, Calvin chooses an element (m , s ) ∈ B y b uniformly at random and considers the corresponding encoding 
1) Summary of Event Definitions
• Event E: The babble-attacked word prefix is such that there is sufficient entropy in Alice's message (i.e., the transmitted message) conditioned on the babble-attacked word prefix.
• Event E 1 : A certain number of messages drawn from the conditional distribution over messages given the babble-attacked word prefix are all distinct.
• Event E 2 : Calvin's chosen message is different from Alice's message.
• Event E 3 : The Hamming distance between the codeword suffixes (with respect to the pushing phase of the attack) corresponding to Alice's message and Calvin's message is not large.
• Event E 4 : The resulting word suffix (with respect to the pushing phase of the attack) is roughly the same distance away from the codeword suffixes (with respect to the pushing phase of the attack) corresponding to Alice's message and Calvin's message.
2) Summary of Claims and Theorems
• Theorem A.1: There are few codewords in the code with large minimum distance.
• Claim A.2: The probability that E happens is bounded away from zero.
• Lemma A.3: The probability that i.i.d. random variables with nonzero entropy are distinct is bounded away from zero.
• Claim A.4: The probability that E 1 |E happens is bounded away from zero.
• Claim A.5: The probability that E 2 ∩ E 3 |E happens is bounded away from zero.
• Claim A.6: The probability that E 4 |E 2 ∩ E 3 happens is large.
• Theorem A.7: Under the "babble-and-push" attack strategy, the average error probability is bounded away from zero. 
Applying the Markov inequality to the random variable n R − H (U|Y b = y b ), we have
where (62) follows by the fact that 4 < R ≤ 1.
Lemma A.3. Let V be a random variable on a discrete finite set V with entropy H (V ) ≥ μ, and let
Proof. Fix i ≤ k and let
denotes the indicator function. We write the distribution of V as
Then we can bound from above the entropy of V as
Since H (V ) ≥ μ, we have
Hence, we have
The event that each V i is distinct is equivalent to the event that for each i ∈ {2, 3, · · · , k}, V i+1 / ∈ A i , which implies W i = 0. 
For large enough n, we have
Proof. From Claim A.2, given event E, we have
, and |V| ≤ q n , we have
Thus,
Let U be the random choice of Calvin's message and X be the random variable of the codeword corresponding to U . Let x p = (x b+1 , x b+2 , · · · , x n ) be the remaining part of the input codeword in the "push" phase and X p be the corresponding random variable. Similarly, 
Then for the "babble-and-push" attack, we have
Proof. From Claim A.4, setting k = 2, we lower bound the probability that E 2 holds given E to be
For general k, Claim A.4 shows that the probability that the k messages drawn from the conditional distribution ρ U|y b are all distinct is at least − 1)(n − b) .
Solving for d and using b = n α q (p) + . Let γ be the fraction of pairs in B y b that satisfy E 2 and E 3 . Then the probability over the selection of set A that event E 2 and E 3 hold is
where X i and X j are the codewords corresponding to the pairs (m i , s i ) and m j , s j in set A, and U i and U j are the corresponding message random variables. However, the probability that {U 1 , U 2 , · · · , U 25
} are all distinct and that at least one pair of codewords, X i and X j has distance less than is Proof. The idea behind the proof is that conditioned on events E, E 2 , E 3 , and E 4 , Calvin can "symmetrize" the channel [17] , [24] . That is, Calvin can corrupt symbols in a manner so that Bob is unable to distinguish between two possible codewords x and x corresponding to two different messages m and m . Calvin does this by ensuring (with probability bounded away from zero) that the word y received by Bob is equally likely to be decoded to be either Returning to the overall error probability, let ρ (y b ) be the unconditional probability of Bob receiving y b in the "babble" phase, where the probability is over Alice's uniform choice of (m, s) and Calvin's "babble" attack. Since the a posteriori distributions of (m, s) and (m , s ) given y b are independent and both uniform in B y b , the joint distribution can be written as Before proving Corollary I.2 we briefly discuss its significance. As discussed in the Introduction, if there are "not too many errors/erasures" then the capacity expression behaves "like that of a certain random error-erasure channel"; whereas if there are "many errors/erasures" then in fact the capacity expression is linear in p and p * . More formally, define the function h(q, p, p * ) = p 1−−1 p * . We distinguish between two strengths of Calvin:
• Weak adversary: If h(q, p, p * ) is less than a certain value ρ * (a value specified in Corollary I.2 that is solely a function of q), then the capacity equals that of a a channel in which np *−1 symbols first get randomly erased, 7 and from the remaining n 1 −
This concludes the proof of Corollary I. 
APPENDIX C PROOF OF LEMMA III.6
To prove the lemma, we first show that log(1 − x) + 2x ≥ 0 for x ∈ 0, 
